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Existing formal models of the relationship between trade policy and regulatory policy suggest the
potential for a regulatory race to the bottom. WTO rules and disputes, however, center on complaints
about excessively stringent regulations. This paper bridges the gap between the existing formal literature
and the actual pattern of rules and disputes.  Employing the terms-of-trade framework for the modeling
of trade agreements, we show how "large" nations may have an incentive to impose discriminatory
product standards against imported goods once border instruments are constrained, and how inefficiently
stringent standards may emerge under certain circumstances even if regulatory discrimination is prohibited.
We then assess the WTO legal framework in light of our results, arguing that it does a reasonably thorough















Existing formal models of the relationship between trade policy and domestic regulatory policy
suggest the potential for a regulatory race to the bottom (e.g., Markusen, 1975, Copeland,
1990, Ederington, 2001 and Bagwell and Staiger 2002, chapter 9). When nations constrain
their tari⁄s through trade agreements, they in e⁄ect promise a certain degree of market access
to trading partners. A subsequent relaxation of regulatory standards (labor and environmental
standards, for example) that apply predominantly to import-competing sectors can undermine
these market access commitments. In particular, if ￿large￿nations relax such regulations, for-
eign suppliers who export to these markets will lower their prices to remain competitive with
domestic producers, and some of the costs of the weakening of domestic regulations are thereby
shifted abroad through these foreign-exporter price (￿terms of trade￿ ) movements. Conse-
quently, these models provide a formal basis for concern that large nations may weaken their
regulatory standards to ine¢ ciently low levels as a way to engage in terms-of-trade manipulation
when they have constrained their trade policies as a result of tari⁄ negotiations. Ederington
(2009) surveys the recent body of empirical research that lends some support to the concerns
emphasized by these models.
The existing race-to-the-bottom models highlight an important potential concern for the
world trading system, but they have limited purchase when it comes to explaining the speci￿c
obligations that have been negotiated in the WTO system with respect to national regulatory
policies, and the actual disputes that have arisen over such policies. In particular, the legal
obligations that explicitly address national regulatory policies ￿embodied in the GATT Arti-
cle III ￿national treatment￿(nondiscrimination) principle, the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS) ￿do not place legal constraints on nations that wish to lower domestic regulatory stan-
dards or otherwise under-regulate their domestic industries relative to some e¢ cient regulatory
ideal. Rather, these legal obligations restrict the ability of member governments to impose
regulations on foreign suppliers.1 Likewise, all of the pertinent disputes in the WTO system
1Of course, the trade implications of under-regulating domestic ￿rms can be quite similar to the trade
implications of over-regulating foreign suppliers, and in this sense a degree of symmetry exists between the
two phenomena. The key point for our purposes is that the speci￿c obligations in WTO law to which we
refer in the text do not prevent nations from relaxing their domestic regulations as they wish as long as they
do not concurrently attempt to impose more stringent obligations on foreign suppliers. Likewise, the body of
WTO disputes is limited to cases in which foreign suppliers complain about new regulations that disadvantage
them, rather than about a relaxation of the regulations applicable to import-competing ￿rms (the one exception
1regarding national regulations, such as the beef hormones dispute (EC prohibition on domestic
production and importation of hormone-raised beef), the asbestos dispute (French prohibition
on domestic production and importation of asbestos-containing products), the sardines dispute
(EC prohibition on labeling of certain species of ￿sh as ￿sardines￿ ), and the recent Canadian
challenge to Korean beef import restrictions (prohibition of Canadian beef imports ostensibly to
prevent mad cow disease), involve complaints about excessive regulation by importing nations.2
This paper seeks to bridge the gap between the existing economics literature on trade
and domestic regulatory policy and the explicit WTO obligations and pattern of actual WTO
disputes. To this end, we develop a formal economic analysis that is capable of accounting for
the basic features of the actual WTO disputes highlighted above. We then apply the results
of this analysis to interpret and evaluate the relevant WTO obligations, and we interpret as
well the WTO disputes that have arisen around these obligations in the context of domestic
regulatory policies.
To undertake the economic analysis, we adapt and extend the general insights of Bagwell
and Staiger (2001) to a setting that can more readily be applied to the kinds of regulatory
standards ￿namely product standards ￿that are typically the subject of WTO disputes. Our
model is tailored to represent the problem faced by a government who must choose trade policy
as well as domestic tax and regulatory policy for a product that is both domestically produced
and imported, and whose domestic consumption generates a negative externality (￿pollution￿ )
that is costly in terms of domestic utility (but does not cross international borders). A higher
standard reduces the pollution generated when the product to which the standard applies is
consumed, but the cost of compliance with a higher standard is also higher. And unless it is
constrained otherwise, the government is free to choose domestic tax and regulatory policies
which discriminate against foreign imports.
In this setting, where a government chooses product standards that must be met for con-
is the Japan ￿Film case, in which it was alleged that lax antitrust enforcement facilitated exclusive dealing
arrangements that disadvantaged imports. We discuss the case a bit further in 3.2 below).
2The existing models do point out the possibility that governments who constrain their tari⁄s in trade
agreements may have an incentive to raise some standards above e¢ cient levels, but this incentive would
typically arise in export sectors. What is not well-represented in the existing formal literature is the incentive to
raise standards to ine¢ ciently high levels in import-competing sectors, which as we have noted seems to be the
type of complaint that is most prevalent in actual WTO disputes. It should also be emphasized, of course, that
observed/actual disputes may represent only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to understanding the scope
of government incentives that are kept in check by existing WTO obligations, since much of the enforcement
of WTO commitments may be accomplished through ￿o⁄ equilibrium￿threats and therefore not manifested in
observed disputes (see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger, 2002, Ch. 6).
2sumption of the product within its borders, goods produced to di⁄erent standards are e⁄ectively
di⁄erent products (i.e., products of di⁄erent ￿quality￿ ). This raises the question of how the
foreign exporter price to the domestic market ￿and hence the terms of trade between the do-
mestic and foreign country ￿should be measured when gauging the manner in which the terms
of trade is impacted by changes in domestic regulatory standards. By focusing on the impact of
changes in policies on the foreign exporter price of the unregulated good ￿and by de￿ning the
terms of trade adjusting for quality in this way ￿we isolate the pure international cost-shifting
incentive that drives the race-to-the-bottom results of the existing literature, and we establish
that this same incentive creates a tendency for governments to impose excessive product stan-
dards on those products that they import from abroad when their tari⁄s are constrained by a
trade agreement.
To show this, we ￿rst extend a key ￿nding of Bagwell and Staiger (2001) to the cur-
rent setting and establish that, despite the complex domestic policy environment, in the
non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium only the tari⁄ is distorted from its e¢ cient level: non-
cooperative domestic tax and regulatory policies are set e¢ ciently. As we demonstrate, this
￿nding derives from the fact that terms-of-trade manipulation is the only motive for ine¢ cient
policy choices in the model, and the tari⁄is the best policy instrument for this purpose. Hence,
the fundamental objective of a trade agreement is to reduce tari⁄s and to enhance trade vol-
umes, without concurrently introducing distortions into the choice of domestic regulatory and
tax policies.
Having identi￿ed the problem, we next derive a number of results that help to illuminate
the possible logic behind features of trade agreements that are designed to correct this prob-
lem. To sharpen this part of our analysis, we focus on a symmetric benchmark of the model
in which the internationally e¢ cient policies take a simple and intuitive form: free trade, a
nondiscriminatory regulatory standard that equates the marginal bene￿t of pollution abate-
ment to the marginal compliance cost, and a Pigouvian consumption tax set at the level of the
consumption externality. With the e¢ cient policies characterized, we then evaluate the e¢ cacy
of various rules to aid governments in their attempts to avoid the ine¢ cient Nash equilibrium
and implement the e¢ cient policies through a trade agreement.
We ￿rst consider an international agreement that merely constrains tari⁄s to their e¢ cient
levels. We show that, absent a nondiscrimination rule applied to domestic taxation, tari⁄
commitments would be completely undone by the introduction of consumption taxes which
3discriminate against foreign products. Hence, tari⁄ commitments alone that are not protected
by a national treatment clause applied to domestic taxation are worthless in this setting.
We next show that a commitment to free trade that is accompanied by a national treatment
clause applied narrowly to domestic consumption taxes still fails to achieve internationally e¢ -
cient policies. The product standards on domestically produced units will be made ine¢ ciently
lax, and higher discriminatory standards will be introduced against imports. The standard on
imports will in general be set at an ine¢ cient level, as will the level of the consumption tax.
Intuitively, when tari⁄s are constrained, other policy instruments become attractive as tools for
reducing foreign exporter prices (terms-of-trade manipulation). The consumption tax can be
used for this purpose to some extent, but it is an imperfect substitute for the tari⁄ because it
applies to both domestic and imported goods. The importing nation will then further exploit
its power to reduce foreign exporter prices by raising the standard applied to foreign imports
while reducing the standard applied to domestically-produced goods. By doing so, the same
overall level of pollution can be attained at a lower domestic cost, because foreign producers
will absorb some of the cost of pollution abatement in order to remain competitive in the do-
mestic market. As we show, when the tari⁄ itself is unavailable to reduce foreign exporter
prices, the regulatory cost-shifting that can be accomplished in this fashion with standards that
discriminate against foreign imports becomes attractive to governments.
We then suppose that governments agree to a national treatment clause that applies to
both domestic taxation and regulatory standards, and we ask: Will a tari⁄ agreement that
is protected by this broader nondiscrimination rule allow governments to reach internationally
e¢ cient policies? Again we show that the answer is ￿no,￿because governments have an incentive
to distort their consumption taxes to ine¢ ciently high levels even if these taxes cannot be set
in a discriminatory fashion, and they may (and will, if product-level consumption taxes are
unavailable) have an incentive to distort upward their nondiscriminatory product standards as
well.
Our economic analysis thus leads to the following broad conclusion. To achieve internation-
ally e¢ cient policy levels in this environment, tari⁄agreements must include rules that prevent
the use of discriminatory domestic tax and regulatory policies, while at the same time prevent-
ing governments from setting excessively high nondiscriminatory taxes and product standards
in response to the ability to shift some of the costs of these policies onto foreign exporters.
With our formal analysis developed, we consider its implications for understanding the
4structure of WTO obligations and disputes. The analysis suggests an obvious role for legal
disciplines that constrain regulations that are discriminatory against foreign suppliers, whether
de jure or de facto, and we relate this role to the national treatment provisions contained in
GATT Article III and the further strengthening of these provisions embodied in the WTO SPS
and TBT Agreements. The analysis suggests as well a possible need for additional legal dis-
ciplines on nondiscriminatory regulatory and tax policies to prevent international cost-shifting
and over-regulation in appropriate cases. In this regard, we note that the explicit obligations
contained in GATT Article III and the SPS and TBT Agreements probably do little to address
this second issue. We then evaluate the possible role for ￿nonviolation￿claims in cases involv-
ing nondiscriminatory regulations, which would allow exporting nations to seek compensation
for reduced market access, but suggest that as currently interpreted the nonviolation doctrine
is also probably ine⁄ective in providing the needed discipline. We discuss why the system
does so little to address ine¢ cient non-discriminatory policies, and suggest that the task of
distinguishing e¢ cient from ine¢ cient policy may be insurmountable as a practical matter.
Regarding this last point, it is interesting to note that Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008)
report evidence that the GATT/WTO tari⁄commitments agreed to by the United States may
have constrained its ability to use tari⁄s for the purpose of terms-of-trade manipulation, and
they also ￿nd that the United States sets signi￿cantly higher non-tari⁄ barriers in import-
competing sectors where it has greater ability to a⁄ect foreign exporter prices. The measures
of non-tari⁄ barriers employed by Broda, Limao and Weinstein re￿ ect a broader set of policies
than simply the domestic regulatory policies that we have in mind here (for example, they
include voluntary export price restraints), but these measures do include domestic product
standards and other technical regulations; and so the evidence reported by Broda, Limao and
Weinstein is suggestive of the pattern one would expect based on our model and legal analysis.
Our paper is related to a number of papers that explore the logic of the national treatment
principle. This is the subject of recent formal analysis in Horn (2006) and Horn, Maggi and
Staiger (forthcoming), but the focus in those papers is on domestic taxes rather than regulatory
standards. Costinot (2008) provides a formal analysis of the national treatment clause as applied
to regulatory standards, but the focus of his paper (comparing the national treatment clause of
the GATT/WTO to the mutual recognition rules of the EU) is quite di⁄erent from our paper.
Finally, Gulati and Roy (2008) also consider the role of national treatment in the presence of
regulatory standard setting, and some of our results parallel their ￿ndings; but they focus on
5the small-open economy case, and as a result the emphasis of the two papers is quite di⁄erent.
In some ways, our focus is closest to Battigalli and Maggi (2003). Battigalli and Maggi
also focus on the treatment of product standards in trade agreements, and like us develop
a possible role for a national treatment rule. But again the two papers emphasize di⁄erent
things. Battigalli and Maggi abstract from tari⁄s and consumption taxes to focus on standards,
and they adopt an incomplete contracts perspective in which standards for existing products
can be and are contracted over, but where standards for future potential products cannot
be contracted over ex ante. They then show how a national treatment rule in combination
with a dispute settlement body can help to remedy the incompleteness of the agreement in
this setting. By contrast, our approach follows that of Bagwell and Staiger (2001) in focusing
on the substitutability between tari⁄s and domestic policy instruments, and in developing a
terms-of-trade interpretation of the externalities associated with national product standards.
The next section presents our economic analysis. Section 3 then provides the legal discussion.
A brief conclusion is contained in Section 4.
2. Economic Analysis
We begin with an economic analysis of the main features of the problem. The purpose of the
analysis is to illuminate some basic insights that will guide the subsequent legal discussion.
2.1. The Basic Model
We consider a simple partial equilibrium model of trade between a domestic and a foreign
country, with ￿ *￿ s denoting foreign variables. The product under consideration is produced in
both countries but only demanded in the domestic country, where its demand can be represented
by the linear demand curve
D = ￿ ￿ P for P 2 [0;￿];
with P the consumer price of this good in the domestic market. Consumption of the good
generates a negative externality (an ￿eye sore￿pollutant) that is not internalized by individual
consumers (and hence does not impact demand for the product) and which does not e⁄ect
production, but which detracts from aggregate national welfare in the domestic country (the
externality does not cross borders).
The domestic government can impose a regulatory standard which speci￿es a (maximum)
6level of pollution generated per unit of the good consumed, and the standard may di⁄er across
domestically produced and imported units. We denote by r the standard imposed on domes-
tically produced units, and by ￿ the standard imposed on imported units, with ￿(r) and ￿
￿(￿)
the associated per-unit pollution levels generated by consumption of domestically produced and
imported units under the respective standards r and ￿. We assume that ￿ and ￿
￿ are decreasing
and convex in their respective arguments.
To meet the standard r, domestic producers must incur the per-unit compliance cost ￿(r);
and similarly, to meet the standard ￿, foreign producers must incur the per-unit compliance
cost ￿
￿(￿). We assume that ￿ and ￿
￿ are increasing and convex in their respective arguments.
For any regulatory standards r and ￿, domestic and foreign supply are then given by






where q and q￿ are the domestic and foreign producer prices respectively.
In addition to the regulatory standards, the domestic government has at its disposal an
import tari⁄ ￿ and a consumption tax t (both expressed in speci￿c terms).3 The foreign
government has an export tax ￿￿ (also expressed in speci￿c terms). Assuming that all taxes
are set at non-prohibitive levels, it then follows that the domestic consumer and producer price
are related according to
P = q + t; (2.1)
while the domestic and foreign producer prices are related according to
q = q
￿ + ￿ + ￿
￿: (2.2)
Notice that all units of the product sell in the domestic country at the same price P regardless
of the standard to which they are produced, owing to the fact that the pollution generated by
consumption is modeled as an ￿eye sore￿externality that has no demand implications: that
is, individual consumers do not di⁄erentiate across units of the good on the basis of how much
pollution it generates when they consume it, and so their willingness to pay for the good is
3A tari⁄ and a consumption tax represent a complete set of tax instruments for the home government in
this industry (i.e., they in e⁄ect amount to an independent consumption tax and production subsidy), because
the tari⁄ itself is equivalent to a combination consumption tax and production subsidy. Also, for now we
assume without loss of generality that the consumption tax is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner across
domestically-produced and foreign-produced goods, and postpone consideration of discriminatory consumption
taxes until our discussion of trade agreements in section 2.3, when a strict incentive to apply discriminatory
consumption taxes ￿rst arises in our model.
7independent of its pollution-generating characteristics. We may also de￿ne the ￿world￿price
(i.e., the price at which the good is available for sale in international markets once it clears




￿ = q ￿ ￿: (2.3)
Equilibrium in this market is determined by the market-clearing condition that the volume
of domestic imports must equal the volume of foreign exports
D ￿ S = S
￿;
which, using the explicit expressions for demands and supplies and the pricing relationships in






[￿ ￿ 2￿ + ￿
￿ ￿ t + ￿(r) + ￿
￿(￿)]: (2.4)
Moreover, using (2.1)-(2.3) we may derive expressions for the market-clearing levels of each of
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[￿ ￿ 2(￿ + ￿
￿) ￿ t + ￿(r) + ￿
￿(￿)]:
It will be helpful in what follows to de￿ne as well the market-clearing foreign producer
price of the ￿raw￿unregulated good ￿prior to bringing it into compliance with the prevailing
regulatory standard ￿as a function of the tax and regulatory policies, and the associated world
price of the foreign-produced unregulated good, by
~ q
￿
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[￿ ￿ 2￿ + ￿
￿ ￿ t + ￿(r) ￿ 2￿
￿(￿)]:
We will refer to ~ qw
0 rather than ~ qw as the terms of trade, although for any ￿ there is a one-to-one
mapping between the two notions of world price as the bottom line of (2.6) indicates.
Our focus on ~ qw
0 rather than ~ qw as the terms of trade is the key step by which we keep the
dimensionality of our analysis at a manageable level, despite the fact that in the presence of
8the (continuous) consumption standard we consider there are an in￿nite number of possible
products that could be imported and consumed by the domestic country, corresponding to each
possible setting of the standard.4 Finally, notice as well from the de￿nition of S￿ that ~ q￿
0 is also
the market-clearing volume of foreign exports (production).
We next introduce expressions for domestic and foreign welfare. Welfare in the domestic
country is given by calculating the usual partial equilibrium measure of consumer surplus plus
producer surplus plus tax revenue, and then subtracting o⁄ the disutility of the consumption-
generated pollution.









[q ￿ ￿(r)]dq ￿ PS(r; ~ q):
Using the pricing relationships above and the de￿nition of ~ qw
0 , the tax revenue collected by the
domestic government (TR) is given by
TR = [ ~ P ￿ ~ q] ￿ [￿ ￿ ~ P] + [~ q ￿ ~ q
w
0 ￿ ￿
￿(￿)] ￿ [(￿ ￿ ~ P) ￿ (~ q ￿ ￿(r))]
￿ TR(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q; ~ q
w
0 ):
Finally, the utility cost of domestic pollution (Z) is given by
Z = ￿(r) ￿ [~ q ￿ ￿(r)] + ￿
￿(￿) ￿ [(￿ ￿ ~ P) ￿ (~ q ￿ ￿(r))]
￿ Z(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q):
With these de￿nitions, domestic welfare may now be expressed as
W = CS( ~ P) + PS(r; ~ q) + TR(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q; ~ q
w
0 ) ￿ Z(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q) (2.7)
￿ W(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q; ~ q
w
0 ):
Domestic welfare is ultimately a function of the domestic regulatory policies and the domestic
and foreign tax policies, but as W(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q; ~ qw
0 ) indicates the tax policies all impact domestic
welfare indirectly through their impacts on domestic and world prices, while the regulatory
4See Bagwell and Staiger (2001, note 8) for a discussion of the dimensionality problem associated with
product/consumption standards in this context.
9policies impact domestic welfare both directly and also indirectly through the price channels.
Finally, using (2.7) and the de￿nition of TR(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q; ~ qw
0 ), observe that W~ qw
0 = ￿[(￿￿ ~ P)￿(~ q￿
￿(r))] < 0 (where here and throughout a subscripted variable denotes a partial derivative with
respect to the variable). This simply re￿ ects the domestic welfare loss that comes when the
terms of trade move against the domestic country (i.e., when ~ qw
0 rises) holding all regulatory
standards and domestic local prices ￿xed: this loss is nothing other than the income e⁄ect
of the terms-of-trade deterioration for the domestic country, which amounts to the domestic
import volume.
Turning now to foreign welfare, the absence of foreign demand for the product under consid-
eration and of foreign pollution makes the foreign welfare measure very simple: foreign welfare
is given by the sum of producer surplus and trade tax revenue. More speci￿cally, using the
pricing relationships above and the de￿nitions of ~ q￿
0 and ~ qw
0 , foreign producer surplus (PS￿)
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￿

























Notice that, as expressed by W ￿(~ q￿
0; ~ qw
0 ), foreign welfare does not depend directly on the
standard ￿ to which foreign producers must comply, but only indirectly through the impact
of ￿ on ~ q￿
0 and ~ qw
0 , the market-clearing producer price and world price of the foreign-produced
unregulated good. Intuitively, we have modeled production of the unregulated good as an
increasing cost (upward-sloping supply) industry, while for a given standard level ￿ the per-
unit cost of coming into compliance with the standard is then constant (and equal to ￿
￿(￿))
regardless of how many units of the unregulated good must be altered to meet the standard. As
a consequence, foreign producer surplus is impacted by the standard level ￿ only to the extent
that ￿ impacts the market-clearing foreign supply decisions for the unregulated good (through
~ q￿
0).5 Finally, using (2.8) and the de￿nition of TR￿(~ q￿
0; ~ qw
0 ), observe that W ￿
~ qw
0 = ~ q￿
0 > 0. This
5If there were a separate increasing-cost industry in the foreign country that took unregulated goods as inputs
10re￿ ects the foreign welfare gain that comes when the terms of trade move in favor of the foreign
country (i.e., when ~ qw
0 rises) holding the foreign local price ￿xed: this gain is the income e⁄ect
of the terms-of-trade improvement for the foreign country, which amounts to the foreign export
volume.
We close this section by developing an expression for the joint (sum of) domestic and foreign
welfare. When we characterize e¢ cient policies in the next section, we will look for the policy
choices that maximize the sum of the welfare across the two countries (and thereby assume
that lump sum transfers are available to distribute surplus across the two countries as desired).
Using the equilibrium condition that the volume of domestic imports [(￿ ￿ ~ P) ￿ (~ q ￿ ￿(r))]
must equal the volume of foreign exports ~ q￿
0, observe ￿rst that the world price ~ qw
0 cancels from
the sum of domestic and foreign tax revenue:
TR(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q; ~ q
w





0 ) = [ ~ P ￿ ~ q] ￿ [￿ ￿ ~ P] + [~ q ￿ ~ q
￿
0 ￿ ￿
￿(￿)] ￿ [(￿ ￿ ~ P) ￿ (~ q ￿ ￿(r))]
￿ g(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q; ~ q
￿
0):
With this and the above expressions for W and W ￿, we may write
W + W
￿ = W(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q; ~ q
w






= CS( ~ P) + PS(r; ~ q) + PS
￿(~ q
￿
0) + g(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q; ~ q
￿
0) ￿ Z(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q)
￿ G(r;￿; ~ P; ~ q; ~ q
￿
0):
Note that the world price ~ qw
0 enters into each country￿ s welfare function, but it does not enter
into joint welfare, because movements in the world price represent pure (lump-sum) interna-
tional transfers between countries: that is, W ￿
~ qw
0 + W~ qw
0 = ~ q￿
0 ￿ [(￿ ￿ ~ P) ￿ (~ q ￿ ￿(r))] = 0.
2.2. E¢ cient and Nash Policies
With the basic model described, we now turn to characterizing the jointly e¢ cient policy choices,
and we characterize as well the non-cooperative (Nash) policy choices that each government
would make in this environment absent any international agreement. By exploring the di⁄erence
between the e¢ cient and the Nash policies, we may then identify and understand the problem
and provided a service which transformed these goods to achieve compliance for a given regulatory standard,
then there would be an additional foreign-producer-surplus consequence of the domestic regulatory choice ￿, but
again the impact would travel through market-clearing prices, in this case the price of the service performed. As
long as this new price is introduced into our measure of welfare in the appropriate way, the added complication
would not alter our basic ￿ndings.
11that a trade agreement must solve in this setting if it is to move governments from ine¢ cient
Nash choices to the e¢ ciency frontier.
To characterize e¢ cient policy choices, observe ￿rst from (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) that world
prices depend on both ￿ and ￿￿ independently, but that ￿ and ￿￿ a⁄ect all local prices only
through their sum. However, as we have observed and as (2.9) indicates, the only prices that
are relevant for joint welfare are the local prices. Therefore, in addition to the choices of t,
r, and ￿, e¢ ciency ties down only the sum of ￿ and ￿￿, not their individual levels. Using the


























































Employing the expressions in (2.4)-(2.8) to evaluate the ￿rst-order conditions for e¢ ciency
contained in (2.10), and denoting the e¢ cient policy choices by ￿E + ￿￿E, tE, rE and ￿E, the
























where here we have used primes to denote derivatives. A number of features of the e¢ cient
policies are worth emphasizing.
First, notice that tE = ￿, and so the e¢ cient domestic consumption tax is set at a Pigouvian
level that re￿ ects the externality associated with consumption of a unit of the domestically
produced good, even if this externality di⁄ers from the externality associated with consumption
6We assume throughout that policy choices correspond to interior solutions of the relevant maximization
problems. It is easily con￿rmed that the second-order conditions associated with the maximization problems
considered here and throughout the paper are satis￿ed under our convexity assumptions for ￿, ￿
￿, ￿ and ￿
￿.
12of a unit of the imported good. The e¢ cient way to respond to any di⁄erence in the externality
generated by consumption of the domestically produced and imported goods is via tari⁄s: as
the top expression of (2.11) indicates, ￿E+￿￿E is positive (a net tax on imports) if consumption
of a unit of the imported good generates more pollution than a unit of the domestically produced
good; and ￿E+￿￿E is negative (a net subsidy to imports) if consumption of a unit of the imported
good generates less pollution than a unit of the domestically produced good. This feature may
at ￿rst seem puzzling, but it can be given a natural interpretation once it is observed that a
tari⁄ can be equivalently thought of as a (discriminatory) domestic tax on the consumption of
the imported good: evidently, then, these two policies together represent the usual Pigouvian
intervention to address the (possibly distinct levels of) consumption externality associated with
consumption of the domestically produced and imported good.
Second, notice that the e¢ cient standard on domestically produced goods rE equates the
marginal per unit bene￿t of reduced pollution that comes with a slightly tighter standard
(￿￿
=
(￿)) with the marginal per unit cost of domestic compliance with the tighter standard
(￿
=
(￿)). Similarly, the e¢ cient standard on imported goods ￿E equates the marginal per unit
bene￿t of reduced pollution that comes with a slightly tighter standard (￿￿
￿=
(￿)) with the
marginal per unit cost of foreign compliance with the tighter standard (￿
￿=
(￿)). In general,
neither the e¢ cient regulatory standards for domestic and imported goods, nor the e¢ cient
level of the externality produced by each type of good, will be the same.7
Third, and related to this last point, it is interesting to consider the e¢ cient policies for
the symmetric benchmark case in which domestically produced and imported goods share an
identical technology, in the particular sense that both domestic and foreign producers face
the same compliance cost for any (common) standard level (i.e., the functions ￿ and ￿
￿ are
identical), and consumption of both the domestically produced and imported good generate
the same per unit level of pollution for any (common) standard level (i.e., the functions ￿ and
￿
￿ are identical). In this case, due to symmetry in the compliance cost functions ￿ and ￿
￿, the
level of r that satis￿es the third condition in (2.11) is the same as the level of ￿ that satis￿es
the fourth condition in (2.11): hence, ￿E = rE. And given that ￿E = rE, symmetry in the
pollution functions ￿ and ￿
￿ then implies by the ￿rst condition in (2.11) that ￿E + ￿￿E = 0.
7See also Gulati and Roy (2008).
13Therefore, in the symmetric benchmark case, the e¢ cient policies are given by
￿
E + ￿














As (2.12) indicates, e¢ cient policy intervention in the case of identical technologies across
countries takes the intuitive form of free trade, a nondiscriminatory regulatory standard that
equates the marginal bene￿t of pollution reduction to the marginal compliance cost, and a
Pigouvian consumption tax set at the level of the consumption externality.
Next we turn to characterize the Nash policy choices. Using the domestic welfare expression
given in (2.7), and facing any foreign export tax ￿￿, the best-response domestic policy choices

















































Similarly, facing any domestic choices of ￿, t, r and ￿, the best-response foreign export tax













d￿￿ = 0: (2.14)
The Nash equilibrium policy choices are the policies that simultaneously satisfy the conditions
in (2.13) and (2.14), ensuring that each country is adopting its best-response policy to the other
country￿ s policy choices.
Using the expressions in (2.4)-(2.8) to evaluate the ￿rst-order conditions contained in (2.13)
and (2.14) that de￿ne the Nash policies, and denoting the Nash volume of foreign export supply
by S￿N and the Nash policy choices by ￿N, tN, rN, ￿N and ￿￿N, the following expressions for





























A number of features of the Nash policies are worth emphasizing.
First, as a comparison of the bottom two conditions in (2.11) and (2.15) reveals, the Nash
standards choices satisfy the same conditions as the e¢ cient standards choices, and indeed
rN = rE and ￿N = ￿E: the Nash standards correspond to the e¢ cient standards. Second, given
that rN = rE, it also follows from a comparison of the middle conditions in (2.11) and (2.15)
that tN = tE: the Nash consumption tax corresponds to the e¢ cient consumption tax. Finally,
given that rN = rE and ￿N = ￿E, it is apparent from a comparison of the ￿rst condition in
(2.11) with the ￿rst two conditions in (2.15) that ￿N +￿￿N > ￿E +￿￿E.8 And it is easily shown
that the di⁄erence between Nash and e¢ cient tari⁄s is driven by each country￿ s incentive to
manipulate the terms of trade (~ qw
0 ) with its unilateral tari⁄ choice (i.e., to impose its Johnson
(1953-54) ￿optimal tari⁄￿ ).9 Finally, it can be seen that the same characterization applies in the
case of identical technologies, by comparing the e¢ cient policies for the symmetric benchmark


























8This follows from our focus on non-prohibitive intervention, which ensures that the Nash export volume
S￿N is strictly positive.

















~ qw + S
￿
~ qw, and hence the second term in this expression is simply the inverse of
the foreign export supply elasticity (which is the Johnson (1953-54) optimal ad-valorem tari⁄ term). A similar
calculation can be performed for the foreign export tax, leading to an analogous interpretation.
15Evidently, then, the ine¢ ciency of the Nash equilibrium can be traced to a single source:
Nash tari⁄s are higher than is e¢ cient, and Nash trade volumes are correspondingly too low,
because each country seeks to manipulate its terms of trade with its tari⁄ (see Bagwell and
Staiger, 2001, on this point more generally). And from this vantage point, a key insight emerges:
despite the complex domestic policy environment, the fundamental problem for a trade agree-
ment to address is to prevent terms-of-trade manipulation and to thereby reduce tari⁄s and
raise trade volumes, without introducing distortions into the choice of domestic regulatory and
tax policies.
This insight can be con￿rmed at a more general level by following Bagwell and Staiger
(1999, 2001) and de￿ning politically optimal policies as those policies that would hypothetically
be chosen by governments unilaterally if they did not value the terms-of-trade implications of
their policy choices. In particular, we suppose that the domestic government acts as if W~ qw
0 ￿ 0
when choosing its politically optimal policies, while the foreign government acts as if W ￿
~ qw
0 ￿ 0
when choosing its politically optimal policy. Politically optimal policies are therefore de￿ned




































De￿ning politically optimal policies in this way then allows us to ask whether politically optimal
policies are e¢ cient when evaluated in light of the governments￿actual objectives, and thereby
to explore whether the Nash ine¢ ciencies identi￿ed above can in fact be given the terms-of-trade
interpretation we have just outlined.
But with the bottom condition in (2.17) implying that W ￿
~ q￿
0 = 0, it is immediate that the ￿rst
four conditions in (2.17) then satisfy the respective four conditions for e¢ ciency given in (2.10),
and it may thus be concluded that politically optimal policies are indeed e¢ cient. Hence, if
governments could be induced to make policy choices free from motives re￿ ecting terms-of-trade
manipulation, there would be nothing left for a trade agreement to do. And as a consequence,
16the fundamental ine¢ ciency for a trade agreement to correct in this setting ￿and therefore the
problem that gives rise to the need for a trade agreement to exist ￿is the unilateral incentive
for governments to manipulate the terms of trade ~ qw
0 with their tari⁄ choices.
2.3. Trade Agreements
With the problem for a trade agreement to address now identi￿ed, we next illustrate a number
of points that can help illuminate the possible logic behind features of trade agreements that
are designed to correct this problem. To highlight the main themes, we now focus on the
symmetric benchmark case considered in the previous section in which domestic and foreign
technologies are identical, and henceforth denote the (common) per-unit pollution function by
￿(￿) and the (common) cost of compliance function by ￿(￿). We do this for two reasons. First,
the assumption itself may often be plausibly met in reality, and indeed the burden of proof
may be rather to explain why technology is not equally available across countries. And second,
even if technologies are in fact distinct across countries, and are distinct in particular with
regard to pollution and the compliance cost associated with a given regulation, it is not at all
obvious which way the distinction would go between imports and domestically produced goods,
and so abstracting from such di⁄erences seems a reasonable simpli￿cation for the purpose of
illuminating the possible design features of trade agreements.10
We begin with a simple thought experiment: What would be the shortcoming of an inter-
national agreement that simply constrained tari⁄s to their e¢ cient levels? After all, as the
discussion in the previous section indicates, of all the policies chosen by governments, it is only
the tari⁄s that are set ine¢ ciently absent an agreement (i.e., in the Nash equilibrium).
An immediate answer to this question is that, without any other limitations on policies,
the domestic government could simply undo its tari⁄commitments by imposing discriminatory
consumption taxes on imported goods, which as we have already observed above are identical
to tari⁄s except by name. Hence, tari⁄commitments alone that are not protected by a nondis-
crimination (￿national treatment￿ ) clause applied to domestic taxation will be meaningless in
this setting. Suppose, then, that countries agree to bind their tari⁄s below their Nash levels
10A more sophisticated analysis might allow for the possibility that each country is privately informed about
the pollution and regulatory compliance-cost details of its own industry, and the analysis might then seek to
characterize the design features of trade agreements that could best handle this complication. This suggests an
interesting direction for research (see Ludema and Wooton, 1994, 1997, Ludema and Takeno, 2007, Bagwell and
Staiger, 2005, and Bagwell, 2009, for some related analyses), but it is beyond the scope of the present paper.
17and also agree (in the domestic government￿ s case) not to impose discriminatory consumption
taxes on imported goods.
To ￿x ideas, let us consider an agreement to eliminate tari⁄s completely, as free trade is the
e¢ cient trade policy in this identical-technology environment according to (2.12) above. If in
response to the elimination of the domestic and foreign tari⁄, the domestic government would
not alter its domestic tax and regulatory policies from their Nash levels, then e¢ ciency would
be achieved, owing to the fact that the domestic tax and regulatory Nash policies are already
e¢ cient as we have shown. The question, then, is whether the domestic government￿ s choices
of t, r and ￿ will be altered by the move from Nash tari⁄s to free trade and, if so, how.
To answer this question, we evaluate the bottom three ￿rst-order conditions in (2.13) under
the assumption that ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿ (and hence the top ￿rst-order condition in (2.13) does not
hold). This characterizes the domestic government￿ s best-response choices of t, r and ￿ given
the hypothetical tari⁄ commitments ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿.
Consider ￿rst the domestic government￿ s best-response choice of consumption tax in this
setting, taken as given the levels of r and ￿. Denoting this choice by tBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿;r;￿), the
following characterization may be derived:
t
BR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿
￿;r;￿) = ￿(r) +
￿ ￿ ￿(r) ￿ ￿(r)
7
+
4[￿(￿) ￿ ￿(r)] + 2[￿(r) ￿ ￿(￿)]
7
: (2.18)
It can be shown that the second term on the right-hand side of (2.18) is strictly positive for
non-prohibitive policies. The third term on the right-hand side is zero if ￿ = r, and is negative
(positive) if ￿ > r (￿ < r). Hence, if r and ￿ remain at their Nash and e¢ cient levels ￿E = rE,
(2.18) implies that the domestic government will raise its consumption tax above the e¢ cient
level (i.e., tBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿;rE;￿E) > ￿(rE) in response to the tari⁄ binding. Intuitively, as
we have already observed, the Nash import tari⁄ is higher than the e¢ cient level of free trade
owing to the domestic government￿ s incentive to utilize the tari⁄as an instrument for reducing
~ qw
0 and hence manipulating the terms of trade to its advantage; and as the bottom expression in
(2.6) indicates, if the domestic government is prevented by a trade agreement from setting its
tari⁄with an eye toward reducing ~ qw
0 , it can (imperfectly) substitute a rise in the consumption
tax t to accomplish this goal.
Consider next the domestic government￿ s choice of regulatory standards. With ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿
and with t = tBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿;r;￿) as de￿ned in (2.18), the ￿rst-order conditions that de￿ne
18the domestic government￿ s best-response levels of r and ￿ can be written, respectively, as
￿￿
=
(r)[2￿ ￿ ￿(r) ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ 5￿(r) + 3￿(￿)] = ￿
=
(r)[3￿ ￿ 4￿(r) + 2￿(￿) ￿ ￿(r) + ￿(￿)];(2.19)
￿￿
=
(￿)[2￿ ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(r) + 2￿(r) ￿ 4￿(￿)] = ￿
=
(￿)[￿ ￿ 4￿(￿) + 3￿(￿) ￿ 2￿(￿) + ￿(r)]:
Solving the two expressions in (2.19) for r and ￿ yields the domestic best-response levels of r
and ￿ given ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿ (and with t set to tBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿;r;￿)), which we denote respectively
by rBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿) and ￿BR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿). Plugging these into the expression in (2.18) then
yields tBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿) as well. Several conclusions may be drawn from the expressions in
(2.19).
First, it can be shown that ￿BR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿) > rBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿): binding tari⁄s at free
trade (or more generally below the Nash level) introduces an incentive for the domestic country
to implement discriminatory regulation against foreign imports.11 Intuitively, as indicated
above, with its tari⁄constrained, the domestic government will look for alternative methods for
manipulating the terms of trade ~ qw
0 : the consumption tax can be raised to partially accomplish
this, but as we have observed it is an imperfect substitute for the tari⁄; and by raising ￿ and
reducing r, the same overall level of pollution can be attained at a lower domestic cost, because
as the bottom expression in (2.6) indicates this maneuver depresses ~ qw
0 and hence forces some
of the cost of pollution abatement on to foreign producers. When the tari⁄itself is unavailable
to depress ~ qw
0 , the regulatory ￿cost-shifting￿ accomplished with standards that discriminate
against foreign imports becomes attractive.
Note also that, in light of our ￿nding that regulatory standards must discriminate against
imports, it need not be the case that the best-response consumption tax tBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿)
is necessarily higher than ￿. In particular, if the incentive to discriminate is high enough,
then tBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿) < ￿, as can be con￿rmed with (2.18). Evidently, the ability to set
discriminatory regulation provides a very attractive means of manipulating the terms of trade
when the ￿rst-best means ￿the tari⁄ ￿is unavailable; and indeed, this attraction may be so
powerful as to wipe out the use of the domestic consumption tax for this purpose.
Second, the two expressions in (2.19) can be used to con￿rm the following feature: we must
have ￿￿
=
(rBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿)) > ￿
=
(rBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿)), while we may have ￿￿
=
(￿BR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿
11This can be shown by supposing that ￿ = r and then con￿rming that: (i) if the top condition in (2.19) is
satis￿ed, so that r is indeed the best-response, then the left-hand side of the bottom condition is strictly greater
than the right-hand side, indicating that the best-response ￿ must be higher; and similarly (ii) if the bottom
condition in (2.19) is satis￿ed, so that ￿ is indeed the best-response, then the left-hand side of the top condition
is strictly less than the right-hand side, indicating that the best-response r must be lower.
19￿￿)) R ￿
=
(￿BR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿)).12 In words, binding tari⁄s at free trade (or more generally below
the Nash level) introduces an incentive for the domestic country to lower the standard that it
applies to domestic production below the e¢ cient level, while the standard that it applies to
imported products is always more stringent than the domestic standard but may be lower or
higher than the e¢ cient level.
Summarizing thus far, we have established that an agreement to eliminate tari⁄s that is
accompanied by a nondiscrimination rule applied to domestic consumption taxes will fail to
achieve internationally e¢ cient policies, because discriminatory standards will be implemented
against foreign imports and the standards on domestically produced units will be ine¢ ciently
lax. In addition, the standard on foreign imports will in general be set at an ine¢ cient level,
as will the level of the consumption tax, although these policies may be set either too high or
too low relative to their e¢ cient levels.
Let us next suppose, then, that in addition to a nondiscrimination rule applied to domestic
consumption taxes, governments also agree to a nondiscrimination rule applied to domestic reg-
ulation. Will a commitment to free trade that is protected by these two rules allow governments
to reach the internationally e¢ cient policies described by (2.12)?
The regulatory nondiscrimination rule amounts to a restriction that ￿ ￿ r. A ￿rst immediate
implication is that international e¢ ciency still cannot be achieved, even with the addition of
this rule. The reason is that the domestic consumption tax will now surely be set higher than
its e¢ cient level as an imperfect way for the domestic government to manipulate the terms of
trade when its tari⁄ ￿and discriminatory standards ￿are unavailable. This can be seen with
reference to (2.18) and by noting that the restriction ￿ ￿ r implies
t
BR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿
￿;￿ ￿ r) = ￿(r) +
￿ ￿ ￿(r) ￿ ￿(r)
7
: (2.20)
As indicated previously, the second term on the right-hand side of (2.20) is strictly positive for
non-prohibitive policies, and so (2.20) implies tBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿;￿ ￿ r) > ￿(r): when tari⁄s are
eliminated and countries commit not to use discriminatory domestic taxes or regulations, the
domestic consumption tax will be raised above its Pigouvian level as a means of manipulating
the terms of trade.









consistent with the two expressions in (2.19). This ￿nding, together with the already-established fact that
￿BR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿) > rBR(￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿), then yields the result.
20What about the regulatory standard level chosen by the domestic government? Interestingly,
once the ability to set a discriminatory product standard is taken away from the domestic
country, when tari⁄s are eliminated all of the government￿ s incentive to manipulate the terms
of trade is shifted to the consumption tax, and the (nondiscriminatory) product standard chosen
by the domestic government is e¢ cient. That is, imposing the restriction that ￿ ￿ r, it can be





(r). Evidently, as long as the domestic government remains free to set its (nondiscriminatory)
consumption tax when its tari⁄options are restricted through an international trade agreement,
the appeal to use product standards as a means to manipulate the terms of trade is completely
eliminated if the standards must be set in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
Intuitively, this last ￿nding is analogous to the ￿nding reported earlier, that product stan-
dards are not distorted when the domestic government is free to use its tari⁄ as a means to
manipulate the terms of trade. To see this analogy, recall that the tari⁄ is identical to a
discriminatory tax imposed on consumption of the imported good, and so this earlier ￿nding
indicates that a discriminatory consumption tax always dominates the use of (possibly discrim-
inatory) product standards for the purpose of terms-of-trade manipulation, implying in turn
that product standards are not distorted when discriminatory consumption taxes are available.
As we have demonstrated, if the tari⁄ is set to zero and discriminatory consumption taxes are
prohibited but discriminatory product standards are still permitted, then the ability to discrim-
inate against imports with product standards becomes attractive to the domestic government,
and both the nondiscriminatory consumption tax and discriminatory product standards be-
come part of the domestic government￿ s preferred method for manipulating the terms of trade.
What our last ￿nding indicates is that, if discriminatory product standards are also prohib-
ited, so that the domestic government is faced with the prospect of using nondiscriminatory
consumption taxes and nondiscriminatory product standards for terms-of-trade manipulation,
the use of consumption taxes will once again dominate the use of product standards for this
purpose, and as a consequence (nondiscriminatory) product standards are not distorted when
(nondiscriminatory) consumption taxes are available.
Our analysis thus far has adopted the view that good-speci￿c consumption taxes are avail-
able to the domestic government. As the discussion just above suggests, the ability of govern-
ments to tailor speci￿c consumption taxes at the same level of product detail as tari⁄s and
product standards plays a crucial role in our results. In practice, consumption taxes are some-
21times tailored to speci￿c products (e.g., gasoline), but more generally the collection costs of
such ￿ne-level consumption taxes make them broadly unattractive to governments. Therefore,
in the next section we brie￿ y consider how our results must be modi￿ed when the consumption
tax instrument is unavailable to the domestic government in the industry under consideration.
Before turning to this additional consideration, however, we make one ￿nal observation in
the present setting. To do so, let us now return to the situation considered earlier in which
countries agree to eliminate tari⁄s and also agree (in the domestic government￿ s case) not to
impose discriminatory consumption taxes on imported goods but do not agree to rule out the
use of discriminatory regulations. But now suppose that in addition the domestic government
submits to the following rule: if, subsequent to the agreement, it alters its non-tari⁄ policies,
then it will simultaneously adjust its tari⁄ so that its combined tari⁄ and non-tari⁄ policy
adjustments do not alter the volume of imports it demands at the existing terms of trade. If
we use the phrase ￿market access￿to denote the volume of imports demanded at a given terms
of trade, then we can think of this as a market-access preservation rule. The question we wish
to ask is whether countries could achieve e¢ cient policies under the described agreement in the
presence of such a rule. The answer turns out to be ￿yes,￿and the logic is simple to describe
(see Bagwell and Staiger, 2001, for a related discussion).
Speci￿cally, with the agreed elimination of tari⁄s ensuring that tari⁄s are set at their e¢ cient
(and politically optimal) free-trade level, we need only check that the domestic government
would have no incentive to alter its tax and regulatory policies from their Nash and e¢ cient
(and politically optimal) levels under the terms of the market-access preservation rule. Under
this rule, however, the allowable adjustments in the domestic country￿ s policies cannot alter
the volume of imports it demands at the existing terms of trade ~ qw
0 ; and as the volume of
exports o⁄ered by foreign producers is also unchanged at existing terms of trade, it follows
that the market clearing terms of trade itself ~ qw
0 cannot be a⁄ected by the policy adjustments
available to the domestic government under this rule. But then, in selecting its preferred levels
of t, r and ￿, the domestic government is induced to satisfy the middle three conditions for
political optimality contained in (2.17), with the ￿rst and last condition in (2.17) then being
satis￿ed by the negotiated commitment to free trade. Hence, the described tari⁄ agreement,
in combination with the market-access preservation rule, implements the politically optimal
policies and therefore achieves the e¢ ciency frontier.13
13A simple way to see that this must be true is to note that e¢ ciency will be achieved under the free-trade
22A notable feature of the market-access preservation rule in this environment is that, to
deliver its desirable impact, it must be de￿ned with respect to the world price of the unregulated
good ~ qw
0 rather than with respect to ~ qw, the world price of the version of the good actually being
imported by the domestic country under its chosen standard. The reason is simple to understand
in light of the above analysis: a rule that prevents the domestic country from altering the foreign
exporter price of the unregulated good as it considers various levels of domestic taxes and
regulatory standards ensures that the domestic country pays the full price of higher standards
and taxes and ￿as it also enjoys the full bene￿ts ￿therefore makes internationally e¢ cient
policy choices.
2.4. Limitations on Domestic Tax Instruments
In this section we brie￿ y consider how our results must be modi￿ed when the consumption tax
instrument is unavailable to the domestic government in the industry under consideration, i.e.,
we set t ￿ 0.14 According to (2.1), this implies P ￿ q so that there is a single local (producer and
consumer) price in the domestic industry which we denote by q, with the pricing relationships
in (2.2) and (2.3) then still applying. To highlight the main point, we focus on the symmetric
benchmark case in which there is a common per-unit pollution function ￿(￿) and a common cost
of compliance function ￿(￿) across countries, and we consider only nondiscriminatory standards,
i.e., we impose ￿ ￿ r. Our purpose is to consider whether the nondiscriminatory standard r
remains undistorted when tari⁄s are constrained by a trade agreement, as we established above,
if the consumption tax t is not an instrument that is available to the domestic government in
the industry under consideration; and if the standard is distorted, to determine the direction
of the distortion.
Proceeding as before, we may derive the market-clearing world price as a function of the





[￿ ￿ 2￿ + ￿
￿ + 2￿(r)]; (2.21)
agreement if only the domestic government does not alter its domestic tax and regulatory policies from their
Nash levels; and note as well that the market-access preservation rule, by preserving ~ qw
0 , must also preserve
the level of foreign welfare W￿(~ q￿
0; ~ qw
0 ), because ￿￿ and hence ~ q￿
0 must also be unchanged; but then, with the
elimination of tari⁄s and beginning from the Nash domestic tax and regulatory policies, the e¢ ciency of this
starting point ensures that it is impossible for the domestic government to ￿nd alternative domestic tax and
regulatory policies to the Nash policies which would satisfy the market-access preservation rule (and thereby
preserve the level of foreign welfare) and yet make itself better o⁄.
14As mentioned in the previous subsection, such a restriction on instruments can be motivated by the high
level of collection costs that would likely accompany a system of consumption taxes that varied by product.
23and also the market-clearing levels of the local domestic and foreign prices as functions of the
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[￿ ￿ 2(￿ + ￿
￿) + 2￿(r)]:
In addition, the market-clearing foreign producer price of the unregulated good, and the world
price of the unregulated good ￿which we continue to call the terms of trade ￿are given by
~ q
￿
0 ￿ ~ q
￿ ￿ ￿(r) =
1
3
[￿ ￿ 2(￿ + ￿
￿) ￿ ￿(r)]; and (2.23)
~ q
w
0 ￿ ~ q
w ￿ ￿(r) =
1
3
[￿ ￿ 2￿ + ￿
￿ ￿ ￿(r)]:
Consider next the expressions for domestic and foreign welfare. Foreign welfare continues
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Domestic welfare is now given by
W = CS(~ q) + PS(r; ~ q) + TR(r; ~ q; ~ q
w
0 ) ￿ Z(r; ~ q) (2.25)







[￿ ￿ q]dq ￿ CS(~ q); PS =
Z ~ q
￿(r)
[q ￿ ￿(r)]dq ￿ PS(r; ~ q);
TR = [~ q ￿ ~ q
w
0 ￿ ￿(r)] ￿ [(￿ ￿ ~ q) ￿ (~ q ￿ ￿(r))] ￿ TR(r; ~ q; ~ q
w
0 ); and
Z = ￿(r) ￿ [￿ ￿ ~ q] ￿ Z(r; ~ q):
Finally, we develop an expression for the joint (sum of) domestic and foreign welfare. As
before, using the equilibrium condition that the volume of domestic imports [(￿￿~ q)￿(~ q￿￿(r))]
24must equal the volume of foreign exports ~ q￿
0, the world price ~ qw
0 again cancels from the sum of
domestic and foreign tax revenue:
TR(r; ~ q; ~ q
w





0 ) = [~ q ￿ ~ q
￿
0 ￿ ￿(r)] ￿ [(￿ ￿ ~ q) ￿ (~ q ￿ ￿(r))]
￿ g(r; ~ q; ~ q
￿
0):
With this and the above expressions for W and W ￿, we may write
W + W
￿ = W(r; ~ q; ~ q
w






= CS(~ q) + PS(r; ~ q) + PS
￿(~ q
￿
0) + g(r; ~ q; ~ q
￿
0) ￿ Z(r; ~ q)
￿ G(r; ~ q; ~ q
￿
0):
Consider now the e¢ cient policy choices in this environment. As before, in addition to the
regulatory standard r, e¢ ciency ties down only the sum of ￿ and ￿￿, not their individual levels.
Using the expression for joint welfare given in (2.26), the e¢ cient policy choices must satisfy











= 0; and (2.27)











To facilitate comparison with the Nash conditions, it is helpful to rewrite the conditions for
e¢ ciency contained in (2.27) in a slightly di⁄erent form. To this end, consider the changes in ￿
and r that would hold ￿xed ~ q￿
0 ￿and with ￿￿ unchanged, also hold ￿xed ~ qw
0 according to (2.3).


























Solving the top expression in (2.27) for W ￿
~ q￿
0, substituting this into the bottom expression in











= 0; and (2.29)










0 =0] = 0:
The bottom condition in (2.29) can be interpreted as the (domestic) ￿national￿condition for
e¢ ciency (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2001): it describes the choices of ￿ and r that maximize
25domestic welfare holding ￿xed ~ qw




0 ). The top condition in (2.29) then ties down the trade volume, and can be interpreted
as the ￿international￿condition for e¢ ciency.
We now turn to the Nash policy choices. The Nash policy choices satisfy the ￿rst-order































d￿￿ = 0: (2.31)
With analogous steps to those described just above, we may rewrite the conditions for the









= 0; and (2.32)










0 =0] = 0:
Nash policies satisfy (2.31) and (2.32).














which is di⁄erent than the top condition in (2.29) that must be satis￿ed by e¢ cient policies; but
the bottom conditions in (2.29) and (2.32) are the same. This con￿rms the feature noted above
in our earlier analysis, that the ine¢ ciency of the Nash equilibrium can be traced to a single
source: Nash tari⁄s are higher than is e¢ cient, and Nash trade volumes are correspondingly
too low; conditional on Nash trade volumes, however, the domestic standards are set e¢ ciently
in the Nash equilibrium (i.e., they satisfy the national condition for e¢ ciency expressed in the
bottom condition of (2.29)).
We may now answer the central question of this subsection: Will nondiscriminatory stan-
dards remain undistorted when countries agree to eliminate tari⁄s (as we established in the
previous subsection) if the consumption tax t is not an instrument that is available to the do-
mestic government in the industry under consideration? To answer this question, notice that
26binding the domestic tari⁄ at free trade (or any level below the best-response level) but per-




















The top condition of (2.33) says simply that, as it is bound below its best-response tari⁄ level,
the domestic country would (by de￿nition) bene￿t from a unilateral increase in its tari⁄. But
then, with similar steps to those described above we may derive that










0 =0] < 0: (2.34)
Evidently, as a comparison of (2.34) and the bottom condition for e¢ ciency in (2.29) con-
￿rms, eliminating tari⁄s induces the domestic country to distort upward its nondiscriminatory
standard r relative to the e¢ cient level.
Intuitively, when the domestic government loses the ability to use its tari⁄ as a means
of reducing ~ qw
0 and thereby manipulating the terms of trade to its advantage, it will search
for other means of doing so. Raising its nondiscriminatory regulatory standard r is one such
means, as the bottom expression of (2.23) con￿rms; and when adjustments in a product-level
consumption tax are not possible, as in the present subsection, upward distortions in regulatory
standards become attractive for the domestic government in this setting once it commits to a
policy of free trade, because a portion of the cost of compliance with these higher standards is
shifted onto foreign producers in the form of a lower ~ qw
0 .
2.5. Summary
We now provide a summary of the results of our economic analysis to aid in the legal discus-
sion below. In the symmetric benchmark case where the consumption-externality-generating
function and the compliance-cost function are identical for the foreign and domestic industry,
and given the assumption that both governments maximize the traditional measure of national
welfare (the sum of domestic consumer surplus, producer surplus and government revenue) net
of the disutility of consumption-generated pollution, the e¢ cient trade policy is free trade. The
e¢ cient regulatory standard for imported and domestic goods equates the marginal bene￿t
of an increase in the standard (which reduces the externality) with the marginal increase in
27compliance cost. The optimal standard will be the same for both imported and domestic goods
(given the symmetry assumption). The e¢ cient consumption tax is equal to the marginal social
cost of the externality produced per unit of the good consumed (in our model the marginal cost
is constant conditional on the regulatory standard).
In the Nash equilibrium, however, an international externality arises because governments
fail to take account of the impact of their decisions on foreign surplus.15 With unconstrained
trade policy instruments, the result is ine¢ ciently high tari⁄s and export taxes much as in the
classic model of Johnson (1953-54). Absent constraints on border instruments, however, there
is no reason to distort domestic taxation or regulation ￿the externality ￿ ows entirely through
trade policy. This result follows from the fact that the most direct way to exploit national
market power over foreign exporter prices is the tari⁄ or export tax.
If the importing and exporting nations enter a trade agreement to eliminate the distortion
of trade policies in Nash equilibrium, however, the potential for other distortions arises. Most
obviously, a constraint on tari⁄s is meaningless if the importing nation can substitute a dis-
criminatory consumption tax. Thus, one would expect a trade agreement constraining tari⁄s
also to prohibit discriminatory consumption taxes. If such discrimination is barred but reg-
ulatory policies remain unconstrained, a discriminatory regulatory standard will emerge that
disfavors imported goods. Like the tari⁄ or discriminatory consumption tax, the discrimina-
tory regulatory standard exploits the fact that foreign suppliers will reduce their prices (for the
unregulated good) in response to it, thus externalizing costs of regulatory compliance.
If the trade agreement also prohibits discrimination through regulatory standards, the analy-
sis changes but the possibility of ine¢ ciency remains. If both consumption taxes and regulatory
standards must obey a nondiscrimination rule, then consumption taxes will tend to exceed the
e¢ cient level because they can still extract surplus from foreign suppliers. Consumption taxes
are an inferior instrument for this purpose compared to a tari⁄ because they also tax domestic
products, but they will still be used to some degree if tari⁄s are infeasible. Regulatory stan-
dards are not distorted in this scenario, however, a result that is best understood by analogy
15This statement corresponds to a slightly di⁄erent but equivalent way of stating the point made formally in
the previous section. More speci￿cally, in the Nash equilibrium the domestic government fails to take account
of W￿
~ qw
0 , the impact of a change in domestic-country policies on foreign welfare that travels through the terms
of trade ~ qw




0 = 0 as we have noted, each country would be led not to value the terms-of-trade implications
of its policy choices, and so its policies would correspond to the e¢ cient politically optimal policies derived in
the previous section.
28with the discussion just above: if both consumption taxes and regulatory standards must obey
a nondiscrimination rule, then the consumption tax again dominates the regulatory standard
for purposes of exploiting national market power over foreign exporter prices, just as in the
case where tari⁄s/discriminatory consumption taxes and discriminatory regulatory policies are
allowed. Finally, if the ability of the importing nation to use (nondiscriminatory) consumption
taxes at the product level is for some reason constrained, an upward distortion of the (nondis-
criminatory) regulatory standard will then arise because foreign suppliers absorb part of the
regulatory compliance cost.
The potential distortions that arise despite the imposition of nondiscrimination requirements
on both taxes and regulation can be addressed in principle through a legal rule that prohibits
the importing nation from imposing any domestic tax or regulatory policy that lowers the
price of the imported good (net of regulatory compliance costs) received by foreign exporters
￿what we term the market-access preservation rule. Under such a rule, domestic measures
that a⁄ect the net prices received by exporters are permissible but their e⁄ects on those prices
must be undone through o⁄setting changes in trade policy. This rule e⁄ectively ensures that
the importing nation will internalize the externality on foreign suppliers from changes in tax
and regulatory policies, and will induce e¢ cient policy choices.
The analysis is more complicated when the foreign and domestic industries are not sym-
metrical. If their respective externality and compliance cost functions di⁄er, the e¢ cient policy
will not in general involve the same regulatory standard for both industries, or even produce
the same marginal externality for each unit of imported and domestic goods. Likewise, a role
for border instruments (tari⁄s or subsidies) survives to the degree that imported goods cause
greater or lesser external harm per unit than domestic goods. The asymmetrical case thus sug-
gests some justi￿cation for deviation from nondiscrimination requirements under appropriate
circumstances, depending on exactly what is meant by ￿nondiscrimination.￿Whether useful de-
viations can be identi￿ed in practice, however, and can be insulated from protectionist capture,
is another matter.
As noted, our results are derived from a model in which governments maximize the tradi-
tional measure of economic welfare (net of the utility costs of pollution). Much of the recent
trade policy literature, by contrast, including Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Bagwell
and Staiger (2001), assumes instead that governments maximize a function that depends on
distribution as well as e¢ ciency. Grossman and Helpman provide micro-foundations for the
29introduction of ￿political economy weights￿into the welfare function, re￿ ecting the notion that
some interest groups are better organized than others. Bagwell and Staiger allow the welfare
function to depend in a very general way on local prices, which also implies that certain inter-
est groups may be favored. The introduction of such considerations into our framework would
a⁄ord other incentives for policy intervention and, among other things, would potentially alter
the result that free trade is (politically) e¢ cient in the symmetrical case. But a more general
political economy approach would not alter the basic insights from our model. As long as gov-
ernments may be presumed to ignore the harm to foreign surplus associated with their policy
decisions in Nash equilibrium, the same externalities that drive our results would remain and
the same tendencies toward policy distortion would arise.16
Finally, an alternative approach to the treatment of domestic regulation in trade agreements
is provided in Regan (2006), and we now brie￿ y draw comparisons across the two approaches.
Formally, our modeling approach posits that when governments formulate their policies uni-
laterally, they ￿take account￿of the e⁄ects of their policy decisions on the terms of trade for
own welfare (but fail to take account of the impact of their decisions through terms-of-trade
movements on foreign surplus, as we have indicated in the text above and in note 15). As we
have demonstrated, this phenomenon gives rise to a reason for governments to constrain their
tari⁄levels through a trade agreement, and at the same time indicates that domestic regulatory
policies ￿even nondiscriminatory ones ￿may be distorted away from e¢ cient levels when tari⁄s
are constrained. Commentators such as Regan object to the analysis generated by such models,
arguing that government decision makers do not in fact ￿take account￿of terms of trade e⁄ects
at all (or even appreciate their existence) when formulating policy.
Regan (2006) then combines his objection to the modeling approach with an implication
of the modeling approach ￿that governments would make internationally e¢ cient (politically
optimal) policy choices if they did not consider the terms-of-trade e⁄ects of their policy choices ￿
to support the following proposition: because governments do not seek to manipulate the terms
of trade, their (nondiscriminatory) regulatory choices will be internationally e¢ cient, and so
￿dispute settlement tribunals should give substantial deference to￿these choices (p. 955). We
16This can be con￿rmed by noting that the introduction of political economy/distributional concerns would
change the way governments feel about movements in local prices, but would still allow us to express the
government objectives as functions of prices and standards as we have done here, and would not change the
properties of these functions with respect to the world price, which is the feature that underlies all of our results
(see Bagwell and Staiger, 2001, for an analogous point).
30view this reasoning as seriously incomplete. It is true according to the terms-of-trade theory
that regulatory choices would be internationally e¢ cient if all governments made their policy
choices without regard to the terms-of-trade consequences. But if all governments behaved in
this way without the constraints imposed by a trade agreement, as Regan argues, there would
be no reason for a trade agreement to exist at all according to the terms-of-trade theory, and
hence no reason for dispute settlement tribunals. In the world that Regan posits, deference
should be given to all national policy choices.17
For Regan (2006), the goal of trade agreements is to eliminate protectionism. But why do
governments care about protection imposed by other governments? In our view, the answer lies
in the fact that their exporters are harmed, and earn less on their export sales than otherwise.
This is precisely the injury that terms-of-trade theory captures. Thus, we view the ￿governments
do not take account of the terms of trade￿objection to the terms-of-trade theory as misguided.
It is not necessary for governments to literally ￿take account￿of terms-of-trade e⁄ects in their
decision making processes for the issues that the model highlights to arise. It is enough that
government policy is the result of a political process in which domestic interest groups are
represented and foreign interests are not. The resulting political equilibrium will then naturally
select policies that ignore the harm done to foreign interest groups, and in particular the
harm due to the fact that tari⁄s, consumption taxes, regulatory standards and the like may
force foreign exporters to reduce their prices to remain competitive. As long as governments
ignore such harm to foreign interests, they will tend to behave ￿as if￿they were consciously
manipulating their terms of trade.
3. Implications: The Structure of WTO Obligations and Disputes
We now turn to the implications of the model for understanding the WTO legal system. We
argue that the core obligations of the system, and at least the bulk of the disputes that have
arisen, are a response to the incentives for regulatory discrimination that arise when tari⁄s
are restricted and consumption taxes are made subject to a nondiscrimination obligation. The
more subtle issue is whether some parts of the system can be interpreted as going beyond the
imposition of a nondiscrimination norm to deal with the distortions that may arise even from
17Of course, some other (non-terms-of-trade) explanation for trade agreements to exist might be introduced
(though it is not in Regan￿ s analysis), but unless that alternative reason is articulated it is impossible to evaluate
whether the alternative reason would provide an incentive for governments to distort their regulatory policies.
31nondiscriminatory regulation.
3.1. The Original GATT
The fundamental objective of the GATT, which was concluded in 1947, was to reduce tari⁄s
that had risen dramatically prior to World War II. The negotiated tari⁄ ceilings were termed
￿bindings.￿
The drafters of GATT anticipated two potential distortions of domestic policy might result
from tari⁄ bindings, both of which are highlighted in our formal analysis. First, they recog-
nized that discriminatory consumption taxes are a ready substitute for tari⁄s. Accordingly,
paragraph 2 of GATT Article III, the ￿national treatment￿ article, provides that imported
goods ￿shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of
any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.￿In addi-
tion, internal taxes and other internal charges may not be applied across ￿directly competitive
or substitutable products￿in a manner ￿so as to a⁄ord protection to domestic production.￿The
obvious intention of these provisions is to disable the use of discriminatory internal taxation for
protective purposes, while recognizing that tax di⁄erentials for other purposes ￿particularly
when imposed on products that are not in a competitive relationship ￿may be justi￿ed.18
Second, the drafters anticipated that tari⁄bindings coupled with a nondiscrimination princi-
ple for internal product taxes might lead member states to use regulatory measures for protective
purposes. Thus, Article III paragraph 4 provides that imported products ￿shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements a⁄ecting their internal sale.￿The evident intention
once again is to disable the use of regulatory and related legal measures for protection, while
allowing regulators the ￿ exibility to respond to di⁄erences across products that justify varying
regulatory treatment. The rather crude mechanism devised for this purpose was a limitation
of the nondiscrimination rule to imported and domestic ￿like products.￿The treaty text also
couched the nondiscrimination rule as an obligation to a⁄ord ￿treatment no less favourable,￿
18We note in passing one potentially worrisome ￿loophole￿in the structure of Article III. Although discrimi-
natory taxation is prohibited, Article III(8)(B) provides that subsidies to domestic producers are not a violation
of the national treatment obligation. Thus, in principle, a nation might mimic the e⁄ects of discriminatory taxes
￿and indeed, mimic an import tari⁄ ￿by enacting a non-discriminatory tax, and then using the proceeds to
fund domestic producer subsidies. If such a policy were transparent, we conjecture that it might be deemed
to violate Article III as a disguised form of discriminatory taxation. Interestingly, precisely such an arrange-
ment was deemed unconstitutional in the United States under the ￿dormant commerce clause￿in West Lynn
Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994). See generally Sykes (2009).
32impliedly recognizing that formally identical treatment is neither necessary nor su¢ cient.
It is noteworthy that GATT did not go beyond the creation of nondiscrimination norms.
Nothing in its text speci￿cally addresses the potential distortions that may arise even with
nondiscriminatory policies (we address the possibility of ￿nonviolation￿claims in a moment).
One small puzzle in the original GATT is the fact that the national treatment obligations of
Article III apply to all products, irrespective of whether they are the subject of a negotiated tari⁄
binding. Absent a binding, why should domestic tax and regulatory policies be constrained? An
answer to this puzzle is also suggested by our model ￿before tari⁄ bindings are negotiated, an
importing nation has no reason to adopt discriminatory domestic tax and regulatory policies.
If measures that violate the national treatment obligation will only arise in response to the
negotiation of tari⁄ commitments, a general prohibition on discriminatory policy has no e⁄ect
except on products covered by bindings.19
3.2. The Nonviolation Doctrine
Article XXIII of GATT contained the dispute resolution provisions. Interestingly, it did not
simply focus on breach of obligations. Rather, it introduced the concept of a ￿nulli￿cation or
impairment￿of obligations as a basis for disputes, and provided that nulli￿cation or impairment
could result, among other things, from ￿the application by another contacting party of any
measure, whether or not it con￿ icts with the provisions of this Agreement.￿ This provision
was understood to re￿ ect the possibility that GATT commitments might be undermined by
measures that did not violate the letter of GATT but that nevertheless impaired market access.
Claims of nulli￿cation or impairment that rest on measures not inconsistent with GATT are
known as ￿nonviolation￿claims. They represent the closest analogue in the WTO system to
the ￿market access preservation￿rule that we consider in our formal analysis.
Even if GATT Article III is limited to situations involving some demonstrable discrimination
(￿less favourable treatment￿ ), might a nonviolation claim be employed to challenge nondiscrim-
inatory regulation that impairs market access? The matter is subject to some uncertainty, but
we suspect that the answer is ￿no.￿
19This position is strengthened if general equilibrium e⁄ects are taken into account, because a tari⁄ binding
in one sector will generally introduce incentives to distort domestic tax and regulatory policies in other sectors
as well once the (general equilibrium) e⁄ects of the tari⁄ binding spread to the rest of the economy. On the
other hand, a caveat to this position arises in the case of asymmetric technologies, though as we discuss in
the previous section the case for discriminatory tax and regulatory treatment of imports on the basis of such
asymmetries seems weak.
33Over the history of the WTO/GATT system, only three nonviolation claims have been
successful (resulting in panel reports adopted by the membership). None of these cases involved
domestic regulation, but instead involved unanticipated changes in subsidies programs or tari⁄
reclassi￿cations.20 The touchstone of these cases has been a change in policy by the importing
nation that could not have been anticipated by the complainant at the time of tari⁄negotiations,
and that signi￿cantly impairs export opportunities.
Only one challenge to domestic regulation has been brought forth in a nonviolation claim.
The French regulation at issue in EC ￿Asbestos prohibited Canadian exports of concrete forms
reinforced with asbestos ￿bers. Canada claimed that such products were ￿like￿concrete forms
reinforced with other ￿bers, and hence that the regulation a⁄orded ￿less favourable treatment￿
to imported (asbestos-containing) products relative to domestic like products, in violation of
GATT Article III paragraph 4. The dispute panel agreed21 (a ￿nding later overturned by the
Appellate Body22), but nevertheless held that the French regulation was permissible under the
￿exception￿to GATT obligations contained in Article XX(b) regarding measures ￿necessary￿
to protect human health.
Canada then argued that even if the regulation did not violate GATT, it nevertheless up-
set Canada￿ s reasonable expectations of market access and should be deemed the basis for a
20In the ￿rst, Chile brought a claim against Australia over a change in farm subsidy policy. Chile had
negotiated a tari⁄ concession on its exports to Australia of a type of fertilizer that competed with another type
of fertilizer. At the time, Australia subsidized the purchase of both types by farmers. Subsequently, Australia
discontinued the subsidy on the type exported by Chile while maintaining the subsidy on the competing product.
The working party found that the change in policy by the Australian government would impair bene￿ts owing
to Chile if the change in policy ￿could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Chilean government...at
the time it negotiated (the tari⁄ commitment).￿ Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, II BISD 188,
193 (1952) (Working Party report adopted on April 3, 1950). In the second case, Germany had negotiated
a tari⁄ concession on sardines imported from Norway. At the time of the negotiation, competing species of
￿sh were classi￿ed under the same tari⁄ heading and given the same tari⁄ treatment. Germany subsequently
changed the tari⁄ classi￿cation system to distinguish among species, however, resulting in a higher tari⁄ on the
Norwegian product than on its competitors. Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, 1st Supp. BISD
53 (1953) (Panel Report adopted October 31, 1952). In the third case, the United States secured duty free
treatment for its exports of oilseeds to the European Union in 1962. Some years later, the EU introduced
agricultural subsidy programs that encouraged the production of oilseeds within the EU. The panel ruled that
GATT members must ￿be assumed to base their tari⁄negotiations on the expectation that the price e⁄ect of the
tari⁄ concessions will not be systematically o⁄set.￿The unanticipated subsidy program for domestic producers
upset those expectations. EEC ￿Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and
Related Animal-Feed Proteins, {148, 37th Supp. BISD 86 (Panel Report adopted on January 25, 1990).
21See European Communities ￿ Measures A⁄ecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
WT/DS135/R, panel report adopted (as modi￿ed) on April 5, 2001.
22See European Communities ￿ Measures A⁄ecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
WT/DS135/AB/R, Appellate Body report adopted on April 5, 2001.
34nonviolation ￿nding. The panel rejected that claim in a ￿nding that was not overturned by
the Appellate Body. The reasoning of both the panel and the Appellate Body in the case casts
serious doubt on the prospect of successful nonviolation claims relating to domestic regulation
in the future.
Among other things, the Appellate Body emphasized (as had various panels) that the nonvi-
olation claim ￿should be approached with caution and should remain an exceptional remedy.￿ 23
And in a part of its opinion not addressed by the Appellate Body, the panel remarked:
By creating the right to invoke exceptions in certain circumstances[through Ar-
ticle XX], Members have recognized a priori the possibility that the bene￿ts they
derive from certain concessions may eventually be nulli￿ed or impaired at some fu-
ture time for reasons recognized as being of overriding importance. This situation
is di⁄erent from that in which a Member takes a measure of a commercial or eco-
nomic nature such as, for example, a subsidy or a decision organizing a sector of its
economy, from which it expects a purely economic bene￿t.
It further stated:
[W]e consider that in view of the time that elapsed between [the tari⁄] conces-
sions and the adoption of the [French] Decree (between 50 and 35 years), Canada
could not assume that, over such a long period, there would not be advances in
medical knowledge with the risk that one day a product would be banned on health
grounds.
Accordingly, the panel ruled that a complainant bears a greater burden of proof in a case
involving a challenge to a regulation that is permitted by Article XX. Likewise, despite the
tari⁄commitment covering the products at issue, Canada had no ￿legitimate expectation￿that
France would refrain from regulating asbestos-containing products for health reasons.
To be sure, the ruling in Asbestos does not foreclose the possibility of a nonviolation claim
based on a change in regulatory policy. But the passages quoted above strongly suggest that
changes in regulatory policy, particularly if they are motivated by genuine concerns for matters
such as public health, will be deemed foreseeable, and thus do not frustrate the legitimate
expectations associated with tari⁄ concessions.
23Appellate Body Report, para. 186.
35There is yet another obstacle to a successful nonviolation claim based on changes in regu-
latory policy. Japan ￿Film involved a claim by the United States that certain governmental
measures in Japan had contributed to the exclusion of U.S. ￿lm producers (Kodak) from the
Japanese retail ￿lm market. In a decision that was not appealed, the panel ruled against the
United States,24 and along the way rejected the U.S. nonviolation claim. Relying on earlier non-
violation cases, the panel held that the complainant in a nonviolation case must ￿prove that the
governmental measures that it cites have upset the competitive relationship between domestic
and imported￿products. It is not enough that the measure has a⁄ected ￿trade ￿ ows.￿ 25 Thus,
in the view of the panel, a successful nonviolation claim in e⁄ect requires a showing that the
regulatory measure produces some discrimination, de jure or de facto, between imported and
domestic products. The Asbestos panel also accepted this proposition, but found discrimination
on the premise that Canadian products which were ￿like￿French products had been banned.
Thus, the pertinent nonviolation decisions to date all seem to suggest that the measure
in question must somehow favor domestic over imported goods. A regulatory measure that
disadvantages them equally (in nondiscriminatory fashion) seems to be outside the scope of the
doctrine.
Should the nonviolation cases be limited in this fashion? Our formal analysis raises some
question about the wisdom of this limitation given that compliance cost externalization by
large countries may, in some circumstances, lead to economically excessive regulation that is
nondiscriminatory. Yet, if nondiscriminatory changes in regulatory policy could be expected to
trigger an entitlement to compensation or retaliation under WTO law, other problems would
likely arise. Among other things, new information can develop over time that changes the
apparent need for regulation. The degree of market access that is negotiated at one point in
time may no longer be politically optimal. If nations were nevertheless required to preserve
market access in the face of new information justifying stricter regulation or else face retaliation
from their trading partners, a disincentive to economically desirable regulation might develop.26
Further, any e⁄ort to devise a rule that distinguished between sound and unsound changes
24Japan ￿Measures A⁄ecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, panel report adopted
on April 22, 1998.
25Id. paras. 10.83-10.88.
26In principle, this disincentive could be reduced through calibration of allowable foreign retaliation to a level
that cannot exceed a reciprocal withdrawal of concessions, and therefore to a level which might approximate a
system of e¢ cient breach (see Schwartz and Sykes, 2002). In practice, of course, such calibration would be hard
to achieve in light of the di¢ culty of assessing the trade impacts of domestic regulatory reform.
36in regulatory policy would likely be fraught with error and uncertainty. In the face of such
challenges, perhaps it makes sense to embrace a presumption that nondiscriminatory changes
in regulatory policy would normally fall outside the strictures of the nonviolation doctrine,
while leaving open the possibility that a nonviolation claim could be brought in exceptional
circumstances (to ward o⁄ cases of obvious abuse).
3.3. The Technical Barriers Agreements
Over time, GATT members became dissatis￿ed with the national treatment obligation of GATT
Article III as the sole textual basis for disciplining regulatory policies that adversely a⁄ect in-
ternational trade. During the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations in the 1970￿ s, the ￿rst
supplementary agreement on regulatory matters emerged, the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade, popularly known as the Standards Code. The Standards Code was a plurilateral
agreement to which 46 GATT members ultimately acceded. During the Uruguay Round, fur-
ther negotiations on technical barriers went forward in two di⁄erent negotiating groups ￿the
technical barriers group and the agriculture group. These negotiations resulted in two new
agreements, the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the WTO Agree-
ment on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), both of which were accepted by all
WTO members. Roughly speaking, the SPS Agreement applies to measures adopted to protect
human, animal or plant health from the spread of pests and from dangerous additives, conta-
minants, toxins and disease-causing organisms contained in foodstu⁄s.27 The TBT Agreement
applies to all ￿technical regulations￿and ￿standards￿not covered by the SPS Agreement.28
Why was GATT Article III alone perceived to be inadequate? The main problem in our view
was that regulatory discrimination can occur in a wide variety of subtle and non-transparent
ways, and can arise even if regulations are nondiscriminatory on their face. For the most part,
therefore, the two technical barriers agreements serve to elaborate and specify the concept of
￿less favourable treatment,￿and thus to clarify and strengthen the nondiscrimination norm
of the original GATT. It is possible to interpret aspects of the agreements as going beyond
nondiscrimination principles, however, and we consider below whether that interpretation is
convincing.
27See SPS Agreement Annex A.
28See TBT Agreement Art. 1.
373.3.1. Elaborating Principles of Non-Discrimination
Many provisions of the TBT and SPS Agreements have straightforward interpretations as corol-
laries of the nondiscrimination norm in GATT.29 For example, both agreements require that
regulatory measures be published through ￿enquiry points￿that are made known to the WTO
membership.30 These requirements ensure that foreign ￿rms seeking to do business in the mar-
ket of a WTO member can readily ascertain what regulations are applicable. Similarly, both
Agreements provide that new regulations must be publicized in advance of their e⁄ective dates
absent emergency.31 Such advance notice requirements protect foreign ￿rms, which are less
likely to have participated in the regulatory process, against unexpected changes in regulation
that may require a considerable lead time for compliance.
Both Agreements also embody an obligation to devise regulations that achieve their ob-
jectives with minimum disruption to trade ￿in legal parlance, an obligation to employ the
￿least restrictive means.￿ 32 The least restrictive means requirement recognizes that regulatory
objectives can often be achieved in a variety of ways, and ￿rms may well di⁄er as to which
method is the cheapest for them. Regulations that require their objectives to be achieved in
particular ways that are cheaper for domestic ￿rms than their foreign competitors are equiv-
29See Sykes (1995 and 1999) for more extensive discussion of the legal provisions in both Agreements.
30TBT Agreement, Art. 10.1; SPS Agreement, Annex B, para. 3. Developed country members also have an
obligation to make all pertinent information available in English, French and Spanish if requested to do so by
another member. TBT Agreement, Art. 10.5; SPS Agreement, Annex B, para. 8. For good measure, a speci￿c
nondiscrimination rule prohibits charging more for such information when it is sold to foreign ￿rms than when
it is sold to domestic ￿rms. TBT Agreement, Art. 10.4; SPS Agreement, Annex B, para. 4.
31Any time a new regulation would depart from an established international standard, or would address
an issue on which no international standard exists, advance notice must be given in the form of ￿notice in a
publication at an early appropriate stage, in such a manner as to enable interested parties in other Members
to become acquainted with it.￿ TBT Agreement Art. 2.9.1. Substantially equivalent language in the SPS
Agreement may be found in Annex B, Para. 5(a). Direct notice must also be provided to the WTO Secretariat,
indicating what products would be covered by the proposed regulation and how it would depart from any
relevant standards promulgated by international agencies. TBT Agreement, Art. 2.9.2-2.9.3; SPS Agreement,
Annex B, paras. 5(b), (c). Exceptions exist, as one might expect, where urgent matters of health, safety or
national security preclude this advance notice. All regulations must also be ￿published promptly￿when they
are adopted. TBT Agreement Art. 2.11; SPS Agreement Annex B, para. 1.
32The TBT Agreement provides that ￿technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary
to ful￿l a legitimate objective...Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia, national security requirements, the
prevention of deceptive practices, protection of human health or safety, animal plant life or health, or the
environment.￿ TBT Agreement, Art, 2.2. TBT Agreement, Art. 2.8 further requires that regulations be
drafted in terms of performance requirements rather than design requirements. The SPS Agreement￿ s version
of these principles requires members to ￿ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only
to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.￿SPS Agreement, Art 2.2. On the
operation of the least restrictive means principle in WTO law, see Sykes (2003).
38alent to regulatory discrimination. The least restrictive means principle avoids this problem.
Thus, for example, a regulation governing ￿re doors in commercial buildings may be drafted to
require a certain ￿burn-through￿time for every door, but should not be drafted to require the
use of particular materials (which may be chosen to favor domestic ￿rms) where satisfactory
performance can be achieved without them. Similarly, a regulation concerning emissions from
automobiles may be drafted to require that emissions of particular pollutants fall below certain
levels, but should not be drafted to require the use of a particular emissions control technology.
A closely related set of obligations concern ￿mutual recognition.￿ 33 Often, nations share
similar or even identical regulatory objectives but may have chosen di⁄erent means to attain
them. If other nations employ regulatory measures that satisfactorily achieve the objectives
of an importing nation and the products manufactured in those nations comply with such
regulations, the importing nation should be willing to allow those products to enter its stream
of commerce. A refusal to do so imposes unnecessary costs on foreign suppliers and e⁄ectively
discriminates against them.
As a ￿nal example (our list here is by no means exhaustive), subtle and not so subtle
forms of discrimination can creep into the process by which regulators certify compliance with
their regulations, generally known as ￿conformity assessment.￿To illustrate, regulations that
require goods to be tested at a particular laboratory or by a particular method when equally
good alternatives are available for certifying foreign products can in￿ ate the costs of conformity
assessment unnecessarily. Accordingly, the technical barriers agreements embody a number of
principles designed to prevent explicit or implicit discrimination in the conformity assessment
process. A national treatment obligation applies, a general least restrictive means requirement is
in place, nations are prohibited from requiring information reasonably necessary to conformity
assessment, nations must process imported goods as expeditiously as they process domestic
goods, the siting of testing facilities is not to be used to disadvantage foreign goods, and notice
and publication requirements apply to the adoption of new conformity assessment procedures.34
33The strongest mutual recognition requirement is contained in the SPS agreement: ￿Members shall accept
the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other members as equivalent...if the exporting Member objectively
demonstrates to the importing Member that its measures achieve the importing Member￿ s appropriate level
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.￿SPS Agreement, Art. 4.1. The TBT Agreement is softer, requiring
that ￿Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations of other Mem-
bers...provided they are satis￿ed that these regulations adequately ful￿l the objectives of their own regulations.￿
TBT Agreement, Art. 2.7. This weaker language amounts at least to an obligation to give reasons for refusing
to accept foreign regulations as equivalent, which should raise the costs of disingenuous refusals to do so.
34See TBT Agreement, Art. 5.1.1; SPS Agreement, Annex C, para. 1(a); TBT Agreement, Art. 5.1.2; SPS
393.3.2. Beyond Non-Discrimination?
Our formal analysis indicates that nondiscrimination obligations alone may be inadequate to
address all of the distortions that may arise in domestic tax and regulatory policies when tari⁄s
are constrained. Can aspects of the technical barriers agreements be interpreted as addressing
these additional externality problems? Our answer is ￿maybe.￿
With particular reference to consumption tax policy, nothing in the technical barriers agree-
ments or elsewhere in WTO treaty text prevents importing nations from employing domestic
consumption taxes as they see ￿t, even if a signi￿cant portion of the resulting tax revenue re-
￿ ects an extraction of producer surplus from foreign suppliers. This observation hints that the
system may be inattentive to the potential for surplus extraction through nondiscriminatory
measures. Indeed, as our formal analysis suggests, taxes are likely the preferred method of
surplus extraction (relative to product standards) because they enhance revenue for the im-
porting nation. As long as product-speci￿c consumption taxes are feasible and unconstrained
except for a nondiscrimination rule, any extraction of surplus from foreign suppliers will tend
to occur through taxation rather than through product regulation. Hence, given the WTO
rules for consumption taxes, it is unclear whether the phenomenon of excessive (nondiscrimi-
natory) regulation is an important one. We would expect it to arise only when product-speci￿c
consumption taxation is for some reason administratively or politically infeasible.
Nevertheless, certain aspects of the technical barriers agreements might be interpreted to
go beyond the elaboration of a nondiscrimination norm. We will focus on three of them here ￿
obligations to employ international standards, scienti￿c evidence requirements, and consistency
requirements.
A number of international institutions develop and publish product standards of all varieties
(including standards relating to quality, health and safety).35 The technical barriers agreements
impose an obligation to employ international standards as the basis for regulation in appropriate
Agreement, Annex C, para. 1(e); TBT Agreement, Art. 5.2.3; SPS Agreement, Annex C, para. 1(c); TBT
Agreement, Art. 5.2.1; SPS Agreement, Annex C, para. 1(a)-(b); TBT Agreement, Art. 5.2.6; SPS Agreement,
Annex C, para. 1(g); TBT Agreement, Art. 5.6; SPS Agreement, Annex C, para. 1(b).
35The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has jurisdiction to address design, safety and
quality concerns in product markets across the board, and publishes thousands of standards as a result of
its work. The Codex Alimentarius, a¢ liated with the United Nations, focuses mainly on food safety issues.
A miscellany of other entities with standard setting functions includes the International Labor Organization,
the International Telecommunications Union, the International Institute on Refrigeration, the International
Commission on Illumination, and others. See Sykes (1995).
40circumstances.36 International standards, one might argue, represent a global ￿consensus view￿
on the appropriate extent of regulation. If a nation chooses to regulate more stringently even
in a nondiscriminatory fashion, the argument might run, that fact is evidence that regulation
is excessive and perhaps re￿ ects the externalization of regulatory compliance costs. An oblig-
ation to employ international standards, therefore, might be seen as a mechanism for policing
excessive regulation that might result from compliance cost externalization.
The SPS Agreement contains a further requirement that regulation be ￿based on scien-
ti￿c principles￿and ￿not maintained without su¢ cient scienti￿c evidence￿except in cases of
scienti￿c uncertainty.37 A departure from international standards under the SPS Agreement
also requires a ￿scienti￿c justi￿cation￿or a ￿risk assessment.￿These ￿scienti￿c evidence re-
quirements￿might also be interpreted as limiting the ability of importing nations to regulate
excessively, even if they do so in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
Finally, the SPS Agreement includes a ￿consistency requirement.￿Each member is oblig-
ated to ￿avoid arbitrary or unjusti￿able distinctions in the levels [of protection] it considers
appropriate in di⁄erent situations.￿ 38 Consistency requirements might also be used to police
excessive regulation that results from the externalization of compliance costs ￿if the same type
of hazard is regulated more stringently in settings where imports have a large share of the
market than in other settings where most of the goods are produced domestically, one might
infer that the stricter regulation results from cost externalization.
Such an interpretation of these provisions, however, is open to challenge. The obligation
to use international standards is a limited one. Under the TBT Agreement, nations are free
to adopt more stringent standards when international standards ￿would be an ine⁄ective or
inappropriate means for the ful￿llment of the legitimate objectives pursued￿by regulation.39
The TBT Agreement further recites in its preamble that ￿no country should be prevented
from taking measures necessary￿to achieve its regulatory objectives ￿at the levels it considers
appropriate￿as long as it complies with the agreement. Under the SPS Agreement, as noted,
members may depart from international standards ￿if there is a scienti￿c justi￿cation￿or if a
member determines that a higher level of protection is ￿appropriate￿after conducting a ￿risk
36TBT Agreement Art. 2.4; SPS Agreement Art. 3.1.
37SPS Agreement Arts. 2.2, 5.7. The TBT Agreement merely provides that in assessing the risks that are
the subject of regulation, the available scienti￿c information is a ￿relevant consideration.￿TBT Agreement Art.
2.2.
38SPS Agreement Art. 5.5.
39See TBT Agreement Art. 2.4.
41assessment.￿ 40 Collectively, these provisions suggest that WTO members enjoy considerable
freedom to select their own target level of risk without much regard to the costs of achieving
the regulatory target or the incidence of those costs.
Similarly, the scienti￿c evidence requirements of the SPS Agreement seem to require only
that some scienti￿c foundation exist for the regulation that is undertaken. They do not require
a balancing of the scienti￿cally identi￿ed risk with the costs of eliminating it. In the ￿beef hor-
mones￿dispute between the United States and Europe, for example, the European prohibition
on the sale of hormone-raised beef was found to violate the SPS Agreement because Europe
could not point to scienti￿c studies establishing a risk to human health from the low residues
found in imported beef, and could not point to studies establishing a risk due to the failure
of exporters to follow sound veterinary practices in the administration of growth hormones.41
Had such studies been in evidence, the scienti￿c evidence requirements would have a⁄orded no
basis for rejecting Europe￿ s zero risk tolerance policy.
The consistency requirements of the SPS Agreement also have limited sweep. They apply
only to ￿arbitrary and unjusti￿able distinctions￿that ￿result in discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade.￿ 42 Again in the beef hormones dispute, for example, the Ap-
pellate Body held that the consistency requirements were not violated simply because Europe
failed to regulate the consumption of products containing natural hormone residues (such as
eggs) even though some such products had higher residues than those contained in the prohib-
ited imported beef. The distinction between arti￿cially added hormones and naturally occurring
hormones was not ￿arbitrary and unjusti￿able.￿
Thus, it is at least questionable whether the obligations to use international standards, the
scienti￿c evidence requirements, and the consistency requirements will do much in practice to
address instances of economically excessive nondiscriminatory regulation. Indeed, it is possible
to interpret all of these provisions as falling within the nondiscrimination framework. If a nation
declines to adopt international standards when they would achieve its objectives adequately,
it might be presumed to be acting strategically to disadvantage foreign suppliers, whose goods
will often meet the international standard but perhaps not the domestic alternative. The
40SPS Agreement Art. 3.3.
41See WTO, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26&48/AB/R, report
of the Appellate Body adopted February 13, 1998.
42SPS Agreement Art. 5.5.
42obligation to use international standards is then perhaps little more than a corollary of the
least restrictive means principle. Similarly, a regulation that has no scienti￿c justi￿cation
might be considered a sham, again designed to raise the costs of foreign suppliers relative
to their domestic competitors. Perhaps a ban on hormone-raised beef, for example, imposes
higher costs on foreign suppliers than on domestic suppliers because the foreign suppliers must
thereafter segregate their herds and undertake expensive tests to prove their exports hormone
free. The SPS consistency requirement is by its own terms limited to cases where inconsistency
causes ￿discrimination￿or is a ￿disguised restriction￿on trade.
In sum, like the nonviolation doctrine, the technical barriers agreements may ultimately
have little to say about ine¢ cient but nondiscriminatory regulation. This situation is perhaps
unsurprising because the task of identifying excessive regulation seems enormously di¢ cult.
How can the law sensibly distinguish situations in which a nation is ￿over-regulating￿because
it externalizes compliance costs, from situations in which the nation has a bona ￿de interest
in stringent regulation because of, for example, a higher implicit value of life or health? An
international system that second-guessed the cost-bene￿t determinations of national regulators
would also likely intrude heavily on notions of national sovereignty and meet considerable
political resistance. Although existing law leaves open the door to excessive product regulation
in some scenarios, therefore, and although as we noted in the Introduction there is some recent
empirical evidence suggesting that excessive regulation driven by terms of trade considerations
may be important, perhaps the cure would ultimately prove worse than the disease.
4. Conclusion
This paper employs a terms-of-trade framework to study the choice of regulatory policies in
￿large￿open economies. We show how the standard terms-of-trade externality that a⁄ords a
rationale for trade agreements to limit protection through border instruments can also lead to
distortion of regulatory policies. In particular, and unlike existing ￿race to the bottom￿models,
we show how terms-of-trade externalities may lead to discriminatory regulatory policies that
ine¢ ciently impose higher regulatory burdens on imports. A nondiscrimination rule applicable
to domestic regulation is thus a useful legal principle for a trade agreement to incorporate.
A nondiscrimination rule does not eliminate the danger of excessively stringent regulation,
however, at least if product-speci￿c consumption taxes are administratively infeasible. The
task of identifying and policing ine¢ cient, nondiscriminatory regulation is nevertheless surely
43a di¢ cult one, which may explain why the WTO legal system does not do much to address it.
We conclude with a simple illustration of the key regulatory cost-shifting mechanism in our
paper using the stylized facts of the beef-hormones case as an example.43 We can think of beef
as the product in our model, and let us suppose that it is produced worldwide according to an
increasing-cost technology that re￿ ects the diminishing quality of pasture land that must be
employed on the margin as the quantity of beef production is increased, generating a supply
curve of beef which is upward sloping. The regulation concerns the intensity with which cows are
treated with hormones as part of the production process: we can think of increases in hormone
treatment as leading to increases in the amount of beef production per acre of pasture land,
and hence as leading to outward shifts in the supply curve of beef. Assuming that individual
consumers are unaware or unconcerned about any health risks associated with hormone-treated
beef, if the beef industry is unregulated worldwide then there will be an optimal level of hormone
treatment that minimizes the cost of beef production, and let us assume that this level is
independent of total production.
Now consider the possibility that the home country imposes a non-discriminatory regulation
amounting to a total ban on the domestic production and importation of hormone-treated
beef. This regulation will not e⁄ect the position of the home demand curve for beef (since
by assumption consumer demands are not sensitive to the hormone content of the beef they
consume), but it will lead to a reduction in global demand for hormone-treated beef and thus to
a drop in its world price (assuming that the home country is ￿large￿in economic terms, as in our
model). Foreign producers who wish to continue to sell to the home country must now shift at
least in part to the production of (higher cost) hormone-free beef. They will be willing to do so
in a competitive market as long as the equilibrium price of hormone-free beef sold to the home
country is just high enough to cover the additional marginal production cost. Note, however,
that because the world price of hormone-treated beef has fallen, the price of hormone-free beef
exported to the home market in equilibrium ￿which is the price of hormone-treated beef plus
the cost of regulatory compliance ￿will rise by less than the cost of regulatory compliance. The
home country will enjoy whatever bene￿ts ￿ ow from compliance with the regulation, but will
have externalized some of its cost. This is the regulatory cost-shifting mechanism that is at the
heart of our paper.
43A key Appellate Body opinion in this long-running dispute is WTO, EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26 & 48/AB/R, report adopted on Februrary 13, 1998.
44References
[1] Bagwell, Kyle, (2009). ￿Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements and Private Information,￿NBER
WP No. 14812, March.
[2] Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, (1999). ￿An Economic Theory of GATT,￿American
Economic Review.89(1), pp. 215-48.
[3] Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, (2001). ￿Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty
and International Economic Institutions,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 519-562.
[4] Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, (2002). The Economics of the World Trading System
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press).
[5] Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, (2005). ￿Enforcement, Private Political Pressure
and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause,￿Journal of Legal Studies 34: 471-514.
[6] Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Giovanni Maggi, (2003). ￿International Agreements on Product
Standards: an Incomplete-Contracting Theory,￿NBER Working Paper No. 9533.
[7] Broda, Christian, Limao, Nuno and David E. Weinstein, (2008) ￿Optimal Tari⁄s and
Market Power: The Evidence,￿American Economic Review.98(5), pp. 2032-2065.
[8] Copeland, Brian R, (1990). ￿Strategic Interaction Among Nations: Negotiable and Non-
Negotiable Trade Barriers,￿Canadian Journal of Economics 23(1), 84-108.
[9] Costinot, Arnaud, (2008). ￿A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Agreements on Prod-
uct Standards,￿Journal of International Economics 75: 197-213.
[10] Ederington, Josh, (2001). ￿International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies,￿
The American Economic Review 91: 1580-93.
[11] Ederington, Josh, (2009), ￿Negotiating over Environmental Policy in Trade Agreements,￿
unpublished manuscript, University of Kentucky, March.
[12] Grossman, Gene M. & Elhanan Helpman, (1994). ￿Protection for Sale,￿American Eco-
nomic Review 84: 833-850.
45[13] Gulati, Sumeet and Devesh Roy, (2008). ￿National Treatment and the Optimal Regulation
of Environmental Externalities,￿Canadian Journal of Economics 41: 1445-71.
[14] Horn, Henrik, (2006). ￿National Treatment in the GATT,￿The American Economic Re-
view 96: 394-404.
[15] Johnson, Harry, (1953-54). ￿Optimum Tari⁄s and Retaliation,￿Review of Economic Stud-
ies 21: 142-53.
[16] Ludema, Rodney and Ian Wooton, (1994). ￿Cross-Border Externalities and Trade Liber-
alization: The Strategic Control of Pollution,￿Canadian Journal of Economics, XXVII,
4, 950-966, November.
[17] Ludema, Rodney and Ian Wooton, (1997). ￿International Trade Rules and Environmental
Cooperation under Asymmetric Information,￿ International Economic Review, Vol. 38,
No. 3, August.
[18] Ludema, Rodney and Taizo Takeno, (2007), ￿Tari⁄s and the Adoption of Clean Technology
under Asymmetric Information,￿ Canadian Journal of Economics, Volume 40, Issue 4,
1100-1117, November.
[19] Markusen, James R., (1975). ￿International Externalities and Optimal Tax Structures,￿
Journal of International Economics 5: 15-29.
[20] Regan, Donald H., (2006). ￿What are Trade Agreements For? ￿Two Con￿ icting Stories
Told by Economists,￿with a Lesson for Lawyers, Journal of international Economic Law
9: 951-88.
[21] Schwartz, Warren F. and Alan O. Sykes, (2002). ￿The Economic Structure of Renegotiation
and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization,￿The Journal of Legal Studies
31(1): S179-S204.
[22] Sykes, Alan O., (1995). Product Standards for Internationally Integrated Goods Markets
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution).
[23] Sykes, Alan O., (1999). ￿Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade,￿
University of Chicago Law Review 66: 1-46.
46[24] Sykes, Alan O., (2003). ￿The Least Restrictive Means,￿ 70 University of Chicago Law
Review 70: 403-19.
[25] Sykes, Alan O. (2009). "The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative
Perspective," (mimeo).
47